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Abstract
We develop a theory which applies to any market dynamics that satisfy a fair market
assumption on the nullity of the average profit of simple market making strategies. We
show that for any such fair market, there exists a martingale fair price which corresponds
to the average liquidation value (at the ask or the bid) of an infinitesimal quantity of
stock. We show that this fair price is a natural reference price to compute the ex post
gain of limit orders. Using only the fair market assumption, we link the spread to the
impact of market orders on the fair price. We use our definition of the fair price to
build empirical tests of the relevance of this notion whose results are consistent with our
theoretical predictions.
Keywords: Fair price, market orders, limit orders, bid-ask spread, liquidity, price impact,
market efficiency.
1 Introduction
One can argue that the main aim of financial markets is to give investors the possibility to
balance their portfolio as cheaply and as quickly as possible. To do that, most modern finan-
cial exchanges allow their participants to buy or sell assets on an electronic order book via a
continuous double auction: Throughout the day, participants can either use limit orders which
enable them to buy or sell a given number of shares at a given price but with no guarantee
of execution, thus adding liquidity to the order book, or they can use market orders which
consume available limit orders thus taking liquidity from the order book. Understanding
the nature and dynamics of this liquidity is of great importance for practitioners who wish
to improve the efficiency of their strategies. For example, brokers who execute large trades
need to split them1 into many transactions and to wait for new liquidity to arrive between
their orders. It is also crucial for regulators and exchanges who aim at improving the global
efficiency of the market, for example by tuning the tick value2 or transaction costs.
∗I would like to thank my PhD supervisors Emmanuel Bacry and Mathieu Rosenbaum for their help in the
realization of this work.
1Such large trades are typically much larger than the liquidity available in the order book.
2On electronic markets, assets cannot be exchanged at any price but only at certain discrete prices. The
tick value of an asset is the discretization step, see [8].
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Several statistical models of order books have been proposed to understand the dynamics of
liquidity. Among them, we can cite “zero intelligence” models, see [7], [24] or [23], which
assume that market and limit orders arrive at Poisson rates. More recently, this topic has
been tackled using mean field games, see [19] or general Markovian dynamics, see [16]. In
[3], the arrival of these orders is modeled as Hawkes processes whose kernels are empirically
fitted to reproduce the causality between the different events. However, in most of these
models, simple market making strategies can yield significant profits on average which we will
see is not compatible with empirical computations, especially for small tick assets3. In this
work, we do not give a complete modeling of order book dynamics but rather conditions that
reasonable models should satisfy. We show that given the impact of market orders on a fair
price that we will define, we can derive the bid-ask spread dynamics.
The most common measure of liquidity is the spread4. The links between the spread and other
market variables (such as the volatility, the daily volume, the risk aversion of market makers
or the transaction costs) have already been the subject of much literature. The classical view
is that limit orders are mainly posted by market makers who sell at the ask and buy at the
bid and thus “earning the spread”, while market orders are used by other agents which can
be seen as brokers or investors who want to execute a number of shares for various reasons
(investment strategies, hedging, regulatory constraints,...).
In the literature, three main reasons are proposed to explain the size of the spread: The
first one is order processing costs, see [15]. However, in modern electronic financial markets,
these costs are negligible compared to the spread5. The second one is the market makers’
risk aversion (see for example [2] and [14] where the average return of market makers is bal-
anced by the inventory risk they take on). The third reason, which we will develop in the
next paragraphs, is adverse selection. Throughout this work, we perform empirical measures
which seem to show that this reason is sufficient to explain most of the spread behavior.
Let us now explain where this adverse selection comes from. When an institutional investor
executes a buy metaorder6, the price on average goes up. This phenomenon, called the mar-
ket impact of metaorders, has been subject to many empirical and theoretical studies, see
[1], [12], [18] or [21]. The impact of metaorders can be understood in two different ways: It
can either be viewed as informational in the sense that investors have a better information
on the future of the price and trade because of this information, thus revealing the price,
see [12] or [18]. Market impact can also be seen as mechanical in the sense that even un-
informed transactions move prices7 through the imbalance in supply and demand they create.
Whatever the reason for this impact, during the execution of their metaorders, investors
mostly use market orders and therefore, the impact of metaorders is translated onto the order
flow into an impact of market orders. This impact has also been the subject of many empirical
and theoretical studies, see [5], [6], [11] or [20]. Because of this impact that market orders have
3A small tick asset is an asset whose average spread is significantly larger than the tick.
4The spread is the difference between the price of the lowest sell limit order (ask price) and the price of the
highest buy limit order (bid price) in the order book.
5At least ten times smaller according to [25].
6A metaorder is a large transaction incrementally executed by an investor, see [12].
7See [17] for a more detailed discussion on this topic.
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on the price, the expected ex post gain of a limit order with respect to the mid price is not
equal to the half spread: It is on average equal to the half spread minus the average market
impact of a market order on the mid price. This phenomenon is called adverse selection.
Theoretical studies using adverse selection to explain the bid-ask spread are often rooted to
[13], where the bid and ask prices are set by market makers so that the expected ex post gain
of their limit orders with respect to the fundamental value of the stock is equal to zero. In
[20], the authors propose a simple AR(1)-type order flow model where the impact on a “fair
price” is proportional to the surprise in the order flow8 so that the fair price is a martingale.
In this model, bid and ask prices are set so that the expected ex post gain of a limit order
with respect to the fair price is equal to zero. In [25], Bouchaud et al. apply these ideas to
the more realistic FARIMA volume model, see [4]. Assuming that most of price moves are
due to volume impact and not exogenous information, they obtain nice relationships between
the spread, market impact and the volatility per trade which are consistent with empirical
measures. This theory has been extended to large tick assets in [8].
In most of the models cited above and in many other studies of the behavior of liquidity,
spread and impact, there exists an unobservable reference price (called for example funda-
mental value [20], efficient price [9], [22] or fair price [14]). This price often represents some
martingale underlying value estimated by market participants based on the available infor-
mation of the stock based on the available information and is used as a reference price to
compute ex post gains. However, it is often not clear what this price really means and why
it is compared to this price that market making strategies should not have positive ex post
gains. In this paper, we assume that market dynamics are given (that is a model for limit and
market orders) where limit orders can be posted at any price (in practice this corresponds to
small tick assets). We will see that in this framework, we in fact do not need to postulate
the existence of a reference price. Instead, we only assume that our market dynamics satisfy
a fair market assumption which states that infinitesimal market making strategies are not
profitable on average.
Our first aim is to show that for any such model, there exists a martingale fair price which
generalises that of [20]. This fair price can be thought of as the expected price for buying or
selling an infinitesimal quantity of stock using limit orders. We will see that this fair price has
nice properties which make it a natural reference price to compute ex post gains. Our second
aim is to show that with no other assumptions, we can compute relations between the impact
of market orders on this fair price and the liquidity in the order book. We revisit important
theoretical results on the spread in light of our fair price. We show that even though on data
we cannot compute independently of a model the impact function of market orders on the
fair price or even the value of the fair price, we can estimate average ex post gains compared
to our fair price. We obtain that our theoretical predictions hold empirically.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify our no arbitrage hypothesis and
show the existence of a model independent fair price. We propose a way to empirically check
the existence of our fair price that we apply to real data. In Section 3, we give a general
definition of the market impact of market orders. Using our fair price as a reference price
8That is the sign of the next order minus its conditional expectation, see below.
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instead of the mid price, we show that we can easily compute the bid and ask prices from the
fair price dynamics. Furthermore, we empirically check that adverse selection and tick value
explain most the bid-ask spread dynamics. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Fair market and fair price
In this section, we present our framework and our fair market assumption. We notably show
the first of its implications: The existence of a model independent fair price that can be used
to compute the ex post gains of limit orders.
2.1 General framework
Long term investors rebalance their portfolios using metaorders. At a given time, there is a
priori no reason why the flows of buy and sell metaorders should match. Therefore, for the
market to be fluid, that is for investors to always find counterparts to execute their trades,
there must be intermediaries, called market makers, who provide liquidity at the bid and at
the ask in the order book. Since there are many market makers, competition between them
should imply that the spread and the liquidity are set so that simple market making strategies
are at most marginally “profitable” (the profitability of a strategy remaining to be defined).
Indeed, if a simple market making strategy were profitable, other market makers would place
limit orders just in front of the limit orders of the strategy thus making it less profitable until
it is no longer worth doing so, see [25].
In what follows, we assume that market makers are risk neutral (in practice, this can be justi-
fied by the small time scales of market making strategies) and order processing costs are null
(in practice negligible). Therefore, the profitability of a market making strategy is defined as
its average profit.
The concept of “average” seen as expectation being undefined outside of a model, we assume
that we are given market dynamics. This means we have a probabilistic model of buy and
sell market orders and liquidity functions that we define below.
Definition 2.1. We set vAt (resp. v
B
t ) as the volume of buy (resp. sell) market orders at
time t: If there is a buy (resp. sell) market order of volume v at time t then vAt = v (resp.
vBt = v) else v
A
t = 0 (resp. v
B
t = 0). The processes v
A
t and v
B
t are assumed to be equal to
zero except over a finite number points over any finite time interval.
Definition 2.2. We set Liqaskt (resp. Liq
bid
t ) as the ask (resp. bid) cumulated liquidity
function at time t: For any price P , Liqaskt (P ) (resp. Liq
bid
t (P )) is the sum of the volumes
of all ask (resp. bid) limit orders whose prices are smaller (resp. higher) than P at time t.
These two processes are assumed to be right continuous with left limits.
Definition 2.3. We set
at = argminx{Liqaskt (x) > 0} (resp. bt = argmaxx{Liqbidt (x) > 0})
as the ask (resp. bid) price at time t.
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Definition 2.4. The market M is defined as the process:
Mt = (
∑
s≤t
vAs ,
∑
s≤t
vBs , Liq
ask
t , Liq
bid
t )
which is right continuous with left limits in time. We write F = (Ft)t for the natural filtration
of M and F∗ for the natural filtration of the left continuous (in t) version9 of M .
Note that F and F∗ are defined so that F∗t ⊂ Ft and if there is a trade (or any order book
event) at time t, it is known from Ft but not from F∗t .
We also choose the convention that if a market maker sets a limit order at time t and if a
market order arrives at time t, then the limit order is executed (provided price priority is
respected).
In this work, we take the tick value equal to zero (that is limit orders can be posted at any
price). In practice, this assumption corresponds to small tick assets.
Definition 2.5. An infinitesimal market making strategy is a strategy that uses only very
small10 limit orders and that ends with no inventory.
Instead of making an assumption on the nullity of the ex post gain of limit orders compared
to an arbitrary price, we directly make an assumption on the profit of market making strate-
gies. This fair market hypothesis on the market dynamics can be understood as a perfect
competition hypothesis between market makers:
Assumption 1. An infinitesimal market making strategy does not affect the market dynamics
and the expected profit of an infinitesimal market making strategy is zero.
We use this formal assumption on the market dynamics to define a fair price which will be
the expectation of the price at which an agent can buy or sell an infinitesimal quantity of
stocks using limit orders. Our fair price can be viewed as a generalization of the fair price
of the model of [20] that we will present in the next paragraph as an illustration of our fair
market framework.
Remark 2.1. In [10], the same kind of arguments about perfect competition between market
makers is used to compute properties of the impact of metaorders.
2.2 The example of the MRR model
In this subsection, we present the Madhavan Richardson Roomans (MRR for short) market
model introduced in [20], which is a fair market model by construction. We compute the
expectation of what we call the next bid and ask prices after time n. This simple computation
illustrates how a fair price appears in any fair market.
9The necessity to introduce such a filtration will appear in Section 3.
10Say of one share, so that this strategy does not impact the rest of the market.
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2.2.1 The MRR model
The MRR model is a simple impact model in which orders are autocorrelated but prices are
martingale. Moreover, the ask (resp. bid) price is defined as the expected future fair price if
there is a buy (resp. sell) order. Therefore, by construction, the ex post gain of limit orders
with respect to the martingale fair price is null and Assumption 1 is satisfied.
In this discrete time model, the nth market order is either a unit volume buy (εn = +1) or
sell (εn = −1) order and the sign process is an AR(1)-type process:
E[εn|Fn−1] = ρεn−111
with 0 < ρ < 1.
The market impact of an order on the fair price p is proportional to the surprise of the order
flow in the sense that:
pn+1 − pn = θ(n − E[n|Fn−1]) + ζn = θ(n − ρn−1) + ζn
with θ > 0 and Fn−1 is the sigma algebra generated by (εk)k<n and (pk)k≤n and where ζ is
an independent white noise corresponding to the effect of outside information on the price
that we set here to zero to simplify.
In this model, imposing an ex post gain equal to zero for bid and ask limit orders gives the
ask price
an = pn + θ(1− ρn−1),
the bid price
bn = pn + θ(−1− ρn−1)12
and thus the spread
Φn = an − bn = 2θ.
2.2.2 Next bid and ask prices
In the MRR model, bid and ask prices are taken so that the (expected) ex post gain of limit
orders with respect to the fair price is equal to zero. Let us now show that conversely, given
the dynamics of the ask (or bid) price, we can redefine the fair price. To do this, we need to
introduce the following quantities:
Definition 2.6. The next ask (resp. bid) price after time n denoted by nan (resp. nbn) is
the price of the first ask market order after n (n included). More formally:
nan = ainf{k≥n;k=+1} and nbn = binf{k≥n;k=−1}.
Given the dynamics of (a, b, ), we can derive the fair price as the conditional expectation of
the next ask or the next bid price (since they are equal).
Proposition 2.1. We have E[nan|Fn−1] = E[nbn|Fn−1] = pn.
11Therefore, P[n = +1|Fn−1] = (ρεn−1 + 1)/2.
12Note than an and bn are in Fn−1.
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Proof. Because of the Markov property of the sign process and the invariance of the model
with respect to translation of the fair price, the conditional expectation of the next bid price
writes as
E[nbn|Fn−1] = pn + f b(εn−1)
for some deterministic function f b. Let us decompose this expectation:
E[nbn|Fn−1] = E[Iεn=+1nbn+1|Fn−1] + E[Iεn=−1bn|Fn−1]
and use that:
• bn is in Fn−1 so that
E[Iεn=−1bn|Fn−1] = bnP[εn = −1|Fn−1].
• By the tower property of conditional expectations
E[Iεn=+1nbn+1|Fn−1] = E[Iεn=+1E[nbn+1|Fn−1, εn = +1]|Fn−1]
= P[εn = +1|Fn−1]E[nbn+1|Fn−1, εn = +1]
= P[εn = +1|Fn−1](pn + θ(1− ρεn−1) + f b(+1)).
We thus get that for εn−1 = ±1,
E[nbn|Fn−1] = pn + f b(εn−1) = (pn + θ(−1− ρn−1))× (1− ρεn−1)/2
+ (pn + θ(1− ρεn−1) + f b(+1))× (1 + ρεn−1)/2.
Taking εn−1 = +1, this yields that f b(+1) = 0 and then taking εn−1 = −1, this yields that
f b(−1) = 0 and therefore E[nbn|Fn−1] = pn.
In the same way, we can show that E[nan|Fn−1] = pn.
Let us now show that Proposition 2.1 does not come from the particular structure of the
MRR model but only from the nullity of the average profit of market making strategies in
the MRR model. This implies that the fair price can be generalized to any market model
satisfying Assumption 1.
2.3 General definition of the fair price
In a more general way, let us assume that we have known continuous time dynamics for the
ask price, the bid price and market orders and that they satisfy Assumption 1. We begin by
defining in continuous time the next bid and ask prices.
Definition 2.7. The next ask (resp. bid) price after time t denoted nat (resp. nbt) is the
price of the first ask market order after (including) t. More formally:
nat = ainf{τ≥t;vAτ >0}
and
nbt = binf{τ≥t;vBτ >0}.
7
We have the following important result.
Proposition 2.2. Under Assumption 1, we have:
E[nat|F∗t ] = E[nbt|F∗t ].
Proof. If E[nat|F∗t ] > E[nbt|F∗t ], maintaining two limit orders just in front of the best ask
and the best bid prices from t until they are executed yields a positive profit on average. In
the same way, if E[nat|F∗t ] < E[nbt|F∗t ], this strategy yields a negative profit on average.
Remark 2.2. This proposition might at first sight seem unnatural because the ask price is
always above the bid price but we have shown that it is true in the MRR model and we will
see that it is well satisfied on data.
We can now define the fair price.
Definition 2.8. The fair price Pt is defined by:
Pt = E[nat|F∗t ] = E[nbt|F∗t ]. (1)
We have the first following result about the fair price.
Proposition 2.3. The fair price is a F∗-martingale:
E[Pt+s|F∗t ] = E[nat+s|F∗t ] = E[nat|F∗t ] = Pt.
Proof. If E[nat+s|F∗t ] > E[nat|F∗t ] = E[nbt|F∗t ], posting a bid order in t just in front of the
best bid and an ask order in t + s just in front of the best ask gives a positive profit on
average.
It is thus possible to obtain the fair price from any model in which there is an ask price, a bid
price and an order flow process which satisfy Assumption 1. We will see in the next section
that it is possible to proceed the other way around and to get the bid and ask prices from
any impact model on a fair price (as it is done in the construction of the MRR framework).
Moreover, since the fair price is a martingale, the response function associated to it defined
almost as in [6] as
R(δ) = E[Pt+δ − Pt|vAt > 0]
does not depend on δ. Indeed, for δ2 > δ1,
R(δ2)−R(δ1) = E[E[Pt+δ2 − Pt+δ1 |F∗t+δ1 ]|vAt > 0] = 0.
We will later see that this makes the fair price a natural reference price to compute impact
functions.
Remark 2.3. In the previous proofs, we have assumed that we could always place ourselves
just in front of the ask or bid prices. In fact there is the tick value/priority issue which implies
that one cannot place limit orders at any position in the order book and thus Proposition 2.2
should become:
|E[nat|F∗t ]− E[nbt|F∗t ]| ≤ 2α
where α is the tick value. For many assets, we cannot neglect the tick value but in this work,
we assume that it is null.
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2.4 Verification of Proposition 2.2 on data
The aim of this paragraph is to propose a way to empirically check Proposition 2.2 on real
data. By definition of the conditional expectation, Proposition 2.2
E[nat − nbt|F∗t ] = 0
implies:
∀Et ∈ F∗t
E[nat1Et ]
P(Et)
=
E[nbt1Et ]
P(Et)
.
By definition of (F∗t ), we get that for any measurable set E in the image space where
(Mt−y)y>013 takes value, denoted σ˜, we have
E[nat1E((Mt−y)y>0)]
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E] =
E[nbt1E((Mt−y)y>0)]
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E] .
Let us now assume that the market is stationary in the sense that for every E,
E[(nat − nbt)1E((Mt−y)y>0)]
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E] (2)
does not depend on t.
To empirically check that Proposition 2.2 is valid, we need to consider a family of past events
(Ei)i (that are frequent enough) and for every i, we use a law of large numbers to show that
(2) is equal to zero. Here is the list of events that we consider:
• E0 = σ˜.
• E1((Mt−y)y>0): The last market order before t is a buy order.
• E2((Mt−y)y>0): The last market order before t is a sell order.
• E3((Mt−y)y>0): The last mid price move before t is upward.
• E4((Mt−y)y>0): The last mid price move before t is downward.
Remark 2.4. We could have taken any event on the past that happens often enough.
Description of our database
Our database is a list of 25 futures14. Standard notations are used to name the assets. For
each of these futures, we consider all the trading days of January 2012. For each of these
days, we only take the most liquid maturity. We have a list of all the first limit order book
events (market orders, first limit limit orders and first limit cancellations) of the day. We cut
off the first and last hours of the trading day.
13Where M is the market process, see Definition 2.4.
14Data kindly provided by QuantHouse EUROPE/ASIA, http://www.quanthouse.com.
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We then consider a regular time grid (tn) of 10 seconds interval
15 and for every tn, we compute
the Ei((Mt−y)y>0) and the next bid and ask prices. Averaging over the N points of the month,
we can compute the empirical approximations ∆i of E[(nat−nbt)1Ei((Mt−y)y>0)]/P(Ei((Mt−y)y>0)):
∆i =
1
N
N∑
k=1
1Eitn
(natn − nbtn)
1
N
N∑
k=1
1Eitn
. (3)
We present our results in Table 1.
Stock ∆0 ∆1 ∆2 ∆3 ∆4 Tick Spread/Tick
xFGBL 3.31e-3 3.33e-3 3.29e-3 3.33e-3 3.29e-3 1.e-2 1.09
xFGBS 3.27e-3 3.27e-3 3.26e-3 3.21e-3 3.28e-3 5.e-3 1.03
xFGBM 4.05e-3 4.10e-3 4.01e-3 4.05e-3 4.06e-3 1.e-2 1.04
xFDAX 6.26e-2 6.30e-2 6.20e-2 5.76e-2 6.75e-2 5.e-1 1.70
xFSXE 6.34e-1 6.42e-1 6.23e-1 6.33e-1 6.34e-1 1. 1.03
xFEURO 3.42e-5 3.41e-5 3.43e-5 3.40e-5 3.44e-5 1.e-4 1.16
xFAD 3.27e-5 3.96e-5 2.38e-5 3.42e-5 3.11e-5 1.e-4 1.26
xFJY 7.67e-7 5.9e-7 2.92e-6 8.36e-7 7.02e-7 1.e-6 1.21
xFBP 2.74e-5 2.11e-5 3.15e-5 2.94e-5 2.53e-5 1.e-4 1.40
xFCAD 2.94e-5 2.68e-5 3.10e-5 3.01e-5 2.87e-5 1.e-4 1.21
xFCH 3.25e-5 3.14e-5 3.04e-5 2.52e-5 3.83e-5 1.e-4 1.56
xFSP 1.66e-1 1.69e-1 1.63e-1 1.68e-1 1.65e-1 2.5e-1 1.01
xFND 1.01e-1 9.77e-2 1.04e-1 1.00e-1 1.01e-1 2.5e-1 1.21
xFDJ 4.43e-1 4.47e-1 4.36e-1 4.40e-1 4.46e-1 1. 1.39
xFGOLD 3.18e-2 3.08e-2 3.31e-2 3.10e-2 3.26e-2 1.e-1 1.93
xFCOPP 2.31e-4 2.28e-4 2.34e-4 2.43e-4 2.19e-4 5.e-4 2.13
Table 1: Expectations of the difference between the next bid and the next ask for 5 different
events during January 2012.
As we have theoretically shown under the fair market assumption, we observe that for all
events, the difference is smaller than one tick. Therefore for small tick assets, it is marginal
and our prediction is empirically quite satisfied.
2.5 The fair price as a reference price
In a rather large class of market dynamics, we have shown that it is always possible to define
a martingale “fair price” which is the expectation of the price at which it is possible for agents
to infinitesimally buy or sell assets using limit orders.
15We could have taken any reasonable time grid. We choose this one to have enough points to approximate
the expectation by its empirical average on this time grid. It is useless to take points which are too close
together since then they would be too dependent.
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Definition 2.9. We define the expected ex post gain of an ask (resp. bid) limit order compared
to a price process as the expectation of the difference between the price of the limit order and
the price process just after the limit order (resp. the difference between the price process after
the limit order and the price of the limit order).
In this work, the most important property of the fair price is the following result. It explains
why it should be considered as a rigorous reference price to compute ex post gains.
Proposition 2.4. Under Assumption 1, the expected ex post gain of a limit order compared
to the fair price is equal to zero.
Proof. Let us assume that at time t, the expected ex post gain of an ask limit order is strictly
positive. This means that the expectation E of the fair price just after the execution of this
order is smaller than the execution price of the order A. Consider the following infinitesimal
market making strategy:
• Set an ask limit order just in front of this ask limit order.
• Right after the eventual execution of this ask limit order, set a bid limit order which
follows the best bid.
Then, by definition of the fair price (expectation of the price of the next trade at the bid),
the expected execution price B of the bid limit order is the value of the fair price right after
the execution of the ask limit order E . Therefore, the expected profit of this strategy is
A−B = A− E > 0.
In the next section, we apply Proposition 2.4 to limit orders in various contexts.
3 Bid-ask spread, fair price and impact
3.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions on the bid and ask prices
In the previous section, we have given a way to define a fair price and we have shown that the
ex post gain of any limit order compared to this price has to be null under the fair market
hypothesis. Here, we proceed the other way around and show that given a model of the
impact of the flow of market orders on the martingale fair price, we can derive no arbitrage
bid and ask prices (as it is done in the construction of the MRR model). To do so, we proceed
in the same vein as in [20] and [25] applying Proposition 2.4 to limit orders placed at the best
bid and ask prices.
Proposition 3.1. Given dynamics for the fair price and the order flow (Pt, v
A
t , v
B
t ), the bid
and ask prices at time t, at and bt must satisfy:
at = E[Pt+ |vAt > 0,F∗t ]16 (4a)
and
bt = E[Pt+ |vBt > 0,F∗t ]. (4b)
16The notation E[Pt+ |vAt > 0,F∗t ] means lim
ε→0+
E[Pt+ε|τAt ∈ [t, t + ε],F∗t ] that we assume to always exist,
where τAt is the time of the next ask order after (including) t.
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Proof. If at > E[P+t |vAt > 0,F∗t ], placing an infinitesimal ask limit order just in front of at
between t and min(t+ ε, τAt ) gives a positive average ex post gain for ε small enough.
In spite of the recurrence of the concept of market impact of market orders in the microstruc-
ture literature, there is no consensus on how it should be defined or even on what price
it should be computed. In our framework, we can give a natural and model independent
definition of the local average market impact of a trade.
Definition 3.1. For any given market dynamics, we define the local average market impact
at time t of a bid or ask market order as:
AMIaskt = E[Pt+ |vAt > 0,F∗t ]− Pt
AMIbidt = E[Pt+ |vBt > 0,F∗t ]− Pt.
By calling it local, we want to stress that this value can depend on the market state at time
t and is thus difficult to compute empirically.
Remark 3.1. For any h > 0, we could have taken the definitions:
AMIaskt = E[Pt+h|vAt > 0,F∗t ]− Pt
and
AMIbidt = E[Pt+h|vBt > 0,F∗t ]− Pt.
Indeed, since P is a martingale, the definition of the impact does not depend on the horizon.
This independence is another good reason to consider the impact of market orders on the fair
price and not on an arbitrary price as it is often done.
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 3.2. With this definition of market impact, Proposition 3.1 can be rewritten:
at = Pt +AMI
ask
t
and
bt = Pt +AMI
bid
t .
Remark 3.2. This implies the dynamics of (at, bt, v
A
t , v
B
t ) can be deduced from the dynamics
of (Pt, v
A
t , v
B
t ). There is thus an equivalence between these two dynamics under the fair market
hypothesis.
Proposition 3.2 implies that the spread
Φt = at − bt = AMIaskt −AMIbidt
is completely explained by adverse selection. This is in fact not surprising since Assumption
1 essentially says that adverse selection “compensates” the position of liquidity that market
makers set in the order book. In the next paragraph, we show that we can test Proposition
3.1 on data and we will see that it is indeed well satisfied (especially for small tick assets).
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3.2 Verification of Proposition 3.1 on data
As it is not possible to compute model independently the fair price, neither is it possible to do
it for the average market impact of trades AMI. However let us show that we can empirically
compute adequate ex post gains and thus check Propositions 3.1.
By definition of Pt, Equations (4a) and (4b) can be rewritten:
at = E[Pt+ |vAt > 0,F∗t ] = E[nat+ |vAt > 0,F∗t ]17
and
bt = E[Pt+ |vBt > 0,F∗t ] = E[nbt+ |vBt > 0,F∗t ].
Let us now proceed as in Section 2.4. We need the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1. Set
aεt = E[nat+ε|τAt ∈ [t, t+ ε],F∗t ]
and assume for all Et ∈ F∗t ,
E[(aεt − at)1Et1τAt ∈[t,t+ε]]/P[τ
A
t ∈ [t, t+ ε]]→ 0
which is true in any reasonable model since aεt → at. Then, we have
∀E ∈ σ˜, E[at1E((Mt−y)y>0)|v
A
t > 0]
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E|vAt > 0]
=
E[nat+1E((Mt−y)y>0)|vAt > 0]18
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E|vAt > 0]
and
∀E ∈ σ˜, E[bt1E((Mt−y)y>0)|v
B
t > 0]
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E|vBt > 0]
=
E[nbt+1E((Mt−y)y>0)|vBt > 0]
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E|vBt > 0]
.
Proof. By definition of the conditional expectation for all Et ∈ F∗t ,
E[aεt1Et1τAt ∈[t,t+ε]]/P[τ
A
t ∈ [t, t+ ε]]
P[Et, τAt ∈ [t, t+ ε]]/P[τAt ∈ [t, t+ ε]]
=
E[nat+ε1Et1τAt ∈[t,t+ε]]/P[τ
A
t ∈ [t, t+ ε]]
P[Et, τAt ∈ [t, t+ ε]]/P[τAt ∈ [t, t+ ε]]
.
Going to the limit as ε tends to zero and replacing the event Et by (Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E as in
Section 2.4 ends the proof.
Let us now assume that
E[(at − nat+)1E((Mt−y)y>0)|vAt > 0]
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E|vAt > 0]
and
E[(bt − nbt+)1E((Mt−y)y>0)|vBt > 0]
P[(Mt−y)y>0 ∈ E|vBt > 0]
do not depend on t.
17Which in fact means lim
ε→0+
E[nat+ε|τAt ∈ [t, t+ ε],F∗t ].
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Considering the same Ei as before and summing over all the Nask and N bid ask and bid
market order times (taskn ) and (t
bid
n ) of the assets of our database during January 2012, we
need to show that
∆Ai =
1
Nask
Nask∑
k=1
1Ei
taskn
(ataskn − na(taskn )+)
1
Nask
Nask∑
k=1
1Ei
taskn
' 0 (5a)
and
∆Bi =
1
N bid
Nbid∑
k=1
1Ei
tbidn
(btbidn − nb(tbidn )+)
1
N bid
Nbid∑
k=1
1Ei
tbidn
' 0. (5b)
In Table 2, we list the empirical ∆Ai and ∆Bi for our list of futures after the events (Ei)
defined by Equations (5a) and (5b).
Stock ∆A0 ∆A1 ∆B0 ∆B1 Tick NOrders
xFGBL -1.00e-6 1.91e-4 -1.09e-6 -2.08e-4 1.e-2 8.00e5
xFGBS -1.16e-6 6.00e-5 4.72e-7 -7.95e-5 5.e-3 1.98e5
xFGBM -1.08e-6 1.62e-4 7.41e-7 -1.84e-4 1.e-2 3.11e5
xFDAX 1.35e-3 8.10e-3 1.48e-3 -5.77e-3 5.e-1 1.23e6
xFSXE 3.74e-4 2.05e-2 4.36e-4 -2.66e-2 1. 8.27e5
xFEURO 2.44e-8 1.15e-6 2.52e-8 -1.02e-6 1.e-4 1.63e6
xFAD 1.64e-7 7.66e-7 1.59e-7 -3.74e-7 1.e-4 6.37e5
xFJY 4.01e-8 4.41e-8 6.39e-10 4.14e-10 1.e-6 1.27e4
xFBP 1.49e-7 2.93e-7 1.29e-7 -2.55e-7 1.e-4 4.66e5
xFCAD 1.43e-7 5.90e-7 1.45e-7 -1.68e-7 1.e-4 3.98e5
xFCH 2.47e-7 -9.47e-7 1.66e-7 1.34e-6 1.e-4 1.90e5
xFSP 2.73e-5 2.56e-3 2.63e-5 -2.64e-3 2.5e-1 2.98e6
xFND 3.73e-4 2.51e-3 3.61e-4 -1.32e-3 2.5e-1 1.12e6
xFDJ 7.97e-4 2.53e-3 9.24e-4 1.22e-3 1. 7.33e5
xFGOLD 1.88e-3 6.89e-3 6.11e-4 1.53e-4 1.e-1 9.02e5
xFCOPP 2.08e-6 6.10e-6 2.15e-6 -1.79e-6 5.e-4 3.66e5
Table 2: Average next ask (resp. bid) after an ask (resp.bid) market order compared to the
ask (resp. bid) price just before the order after some events.
As expected, we see that the ∆Ai and ∆Bi are always significantly smaller than a tick.
The nullity of average ex post gains of limit orders placed at the best prices for small tick assets
shows that simple market making strategies can only be marginally profitable on average.
Therefore, we have empirically shown that, as postulated in [20] and [25], adverse selection
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and the tick value explain the bid and ask prices and thus the spread. The risk aversion
of market makers and their order processing costs seem to have negligible influences on the
spread.
3.3 Response functions, time horizon and market making
In [25], similar conditions on the profit of market making strategies are used except that the
ex post gain of limit orders is computed compared to the mid price a time δt after the order:
E[at −mt+δt|vAt > 0] for ask limit orders and E[mt+δt − bt|vBt > 0] for bid limit orders.
However, the mid price is not a martingale in general. In particular, the empirical response
function is not constant but significantly (compared to the tick value) increases over time,
see [6]. Therefore, the ex post gain of market makers should depend on the horizon of their
strategies. In particular, it is stated that fast market making should be more profitable than
slow market making.
This is inconsistent with our framework where the average profit of a market making strategy
does not depend on the “horizon” of the market maker.
In order to empirically show that the average profit of market making strategies does not
seem to depend much on the horizon of market makers, we plot the ask (resp. bid) response
function of the fair price defined as:
RAP (δ) = E[Pt+δ − Pt|vAt > 0]
and
RBP (δ) = E[Pt+δ − Pt|vBt > 0]
which also write
RAP (δ) = E[nat+δ − Pt|vAt > 0]
and
RBP (δ) = E[nbt+δ − Pt|vBt > 0]
by definition of the fair price.
In our framework, this function should not depend on δ since P is a martingale. Let us
notice that since we cannot empirically compute model independently the fair price before
the orders, we cannot measure RAP and RBP . However, we can compute the empirical
variations of the ask (resp. bid) response function on the fair price defined as the empirical
average over the ask and bid order times of January 2012:
RAP (δ)−RAP (0+) = 1
Nask
Nask∑
i=1
(nataskn +δ − na(taskn )+)
and
RBP (δ)−RBP (0+) = 1
N bid
Nbid∑
i=1
(nbtbidn +δ − nb(tbidn )+)
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for three liquid assets, see Figures 1, 2 and 3.
Figure 1: Ask (in blue) and bid (in green) response functions for the DAX future. The two
horizontal lines correspond to plus (in red) and minus (in cyan) the tick value.
Figure 2: Ask (in blue) and bid (in green) response functions for the GOLD future. The two
horizontal lines correspond to plus (in red) and minus (in cyan) the tick value.
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Figure 3: Ask (in blue) and bid (in green) response functions for the COPP future. The two
horizontal lines correspond to plus (in red) and minus (in cyan) the tick value.
We observe on Figures 1, 2 and 3 that in accordance with our predictions, the variations of
the response functions computed on the fair price are small compared to the tick value.
Remark 3.3. Notice that there is a slight increment of the ask response function at very small
time scales (below the second) which implies that fast market making might be marginally more
profitable than slow market making. However, this increment is always small compared to the
tick value.
3.4 On tick value, market making and liquidity
We have shown evidence that for small tick assets, the distance of some liquidity from the
best price was perfectly compensated by the impact of market orders which consumed this
liquidity. This gave ex post gains close to zero for market makers. For large tick assets, it
is no longer the case. Indeed, market makers cannot any more perfectly compete by putting
liquidity as close to the mid price as they might wish therefore, the competition is in the
speed at which they take the priority.
This seems to make the markets less efficient. On the other hand, a large tick market might
attract market makers and thus liquidity. Moreover, a large tick simplifies the information
flow that practitioners get. The optimal tick value, should be computed with these arguments
in mind. See [8] for an example of computation of an optimal tick value.
4 Conclusion
We have studied continuous time market dynamics which only satisfy a fair market hypothesis.
Theoretically, this hypothesis can be justified by arguments of perfect competition between
market makers. In this general framework, we have given precise and model independent
definitions of concepts such as fair price, market impact and liquidity that are often present
in the literature on order book dynamics. Taking our fair price as a reference price, we have
derived a relationship between, market impact and liquidity which is supported by real data
analysis.
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From a practical point of view, the strategies of market participants such as brokers depend
a lot on liquidity and impact. Such agents should thus calibrate their strategies using models
which accurately reproduce stylized relationships between these quantities. In particular, in
such models, the ex post gains of limit orders compared to a martingale reference price should
be equal to zero.
Our framework implies that market making strategies are not profitable. Obviously, this
is not rigorously true because it is the competition between market makers that makes our
hypothesis reasonable. The first reason for the coherence between our framework and the
existence of market makers is the tick value which can lead to profits for market makers.
The second reason is that we have only considered very simple strategies and small statistical
arbitrages may remain for more complex strategies. Finally some market participants are
encouraged to provide liquidity in order to obtain advantages for other market activities.
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